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‘Trauma’ has become established as a pervasive trope in discourse and practice 
concerned with the affective legacies of the Northern Ireland Troubles, providing a 
popular as well as a critical framework for understanding the effects of political 
violence during the conflict and memories of that violence during the peace process. 
The concept has proved highly productive in identifying the problem of the past in 
Ireland as a painful and troubling history that remains unresolved in the present and 
requires acknowledgement and redress. It has also generated new kinds of cultural 
and psychosocial analysis, encouraging engagement with questions of feeling and 
affective states marked by pain, distress and disturbance. However, I argue in this 
article that its productivity may have become exhausted as the concept itself 
congeals into normativity, whether homogenised as the trace of an unspeakable 
wound or medicalised as ‘PTSD’ (post-traumatic stress disorder). Placing emphasis 
on psychic entrapment within states of affect derived from experiences ‘in the past’, 
‘trauma’ is open to accusations of being backwards-looking rather than illuminating 
the possibilities and means of transformation in subjectivities shaped by experiences 
and memories of violent conflict – or of conceiving such transformation in the 
questionable language of ‘healing’, ‘closure’ and ‘moving on’. 
 In the first part of this article, I draw on existing critical studies to identify a 
number of problematic assumptions within now-orthodox understandings of trauma 
promoted in what has become known as ’trauma theory’ in the Humanities, and in 
the therapeutic culture centred on the treatment of PTSD. The analysis here focuses 
on the constraining effects of these understandings in three areas of debate and 
practice concerned with legacies and memories of the Troubles, namely academic 
studies of history and memory, victims’ support, and storytelling conceived as an 
aspect of peacebuilding. In the second part, I make a case for shifting the frame for  
investigation of subjective experiences and ‘psychological’ legacies of the conflict, 
away from trauma and towards the history and memory of emotions. Here I identify 
critical resources in theory and history that enable interesting alternative conceptions 
of the internal world of embodied feelings and the meanings ascribed to them, that 
recognize the complex temporalities of emotional experience and that explore the 
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shifting modes of management and containment, expression and performance of 
emotions within social and political relations and practices. Focusing on object-
relations psychoanalysis, Raymond Williams’ cultural materialism, and the emerging 
field of emotional history, I tease out key concepts and insights with the potential to 
inform new ways of thinking about the affective legacies of the Irish conflict and the 
possibilities of their transformation – of ‘moving on’ – in ‘post-conflict’ Northern 
Ireland.  
 
The trouble with trauma 
In an essay problematising what she calls ‘the apparently oxymoronic “popularity” of 
trauma’ in academic debate in the Humanities, Susannah Radstone traces ‘the rise 
of what is becoming almost a new theoretical orthodoxy’; that of ‘trauma theory’ as 
articulated in seminal and widely cited texts by Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman and  
Dori Laub.1 Subjecting this body of work to wide-ranging critical analysis, Radstone 
begins by contextualising its origins and founding assumptions as a marriage 
between theories of representation and subjectivity developed in deconstruction, 
post-structuralism and psychoanalysis, on one hand, and ‘(mainly US-based) clinical 
work with survivors of experiences designated as traumatic’, including the Vietnam 
War, the Holocaust, and sexual abuse, on the other.2 This clinical work is itself 
informed by the diagnostic categorisation of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
one of various ‘mental conditions and disabilities’ recognised (since 1980) by the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA); and also by a ‘neuroscientific approach to 
memory disorders’.3 According to the APA’s widely cited definition, PTSD is 
diagnosed on the basis of psychological and somatic symptoms produced in 
response to ‘an event out of the range of ordinary human experience in which one’s 
life or the lives of one’s family are endangered’, generating overwhelming feelings of 
helplessness and fear.4 The shocking, wounding event is considered to be 
‘unassimilable or unknowable’ by the conscious mind5 and to give rise to a 
‘dissociation’ from the self of its traumatic experience, which ‘comes to occupy a 
specially designated area of the mind that precludes (its) retrieval’ in memory.6 This 
idea meshes with the argument made in neuroscience, that ‘the traumatic event is 
encoded in the brain in a different way from ordinary memory’.7 Leaving gaps without 
trace in memory, the ‘unexperienced’ trauma8 manifests subsequently in recurrent 
symptoms that include re-experiencing of the event (for example, in flashbacks or 
nightmares), the numbing of general responsiveness, and hyper-arousal to certain 
stimuli that evoke associations with the event. 
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 While unrepresentable and incommunicable, the ‘experience’ of trauma is 
held to find displaced expression not only in these psycho-somatic symptoms but 
also in forms of testimony and other cultural representations in literature, film, art and 
the media. ‘Trauma analysis’ of such representations in the Humanities has tended 
to take its lead from Caruth’s oft-quoted argument that trauma is ‘more than a 
pathology or a simple illness of a wounded psyche: it is always the story of a wound 
that cries out, that addresses us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not 
otherwise available’.9 Manifesting in this way an ‘impossible history’ that ‘they cannot 
entirely possess’,10 utterances of the traumatised subject call for acts of listening and 
witnessing whereby ‘some testimony can be made to trauma’s “traceless traces”’, in 
an ‘act of “recovery”’ that represents traumatic experience of the event whilst 
‘acknowledg(ing) the gaps and absences’ in memory and representation.11  
 Radstone identifies a number of theoretical problems with academic 
discussion of trauma conducted on these terms, which tend to be overlooked when 
the value of trauma theory becomes taken for granted.12 I will focus here on three of 
these problems. Firstly, in understanding the ‘wound’ of trauma to be caused by an 
extraordinary event, trauma theory proposes a model of the traumatised subject that 
reintroduces into the Humanities a distinction between the ‘normal’ and the 
‘pathological’: ‘One has either been present at or has “been” traumatized by a terrible 
event or one has not.’13 This dichotomy runs counter both to a fundamental tenet of 
psychoanalytic thinking that rejects these categories and understands forms of 
psychic disturbance as a continuum, and to the model developed in cultural theory of 
the ‘de-centred subject ... engaged in processes of (fear), desire and meaning-
making over which it lack(s) full conscious control’.14 Secondly, in ascribing the sole 
cause of trauma to an event in the external world, the significance of its mediation in 
the internal world and the meanings conferred on it by the subject afterwards is 
evaded: this is to ‘attribute all badness to the world outside’ at the expense of 
recognising, for example, aggression and violence within the subject.15 Thirdly, the 
emphasis placed by trauma theory on ‘the role of the listener or witness in the 
bringing to consciousness of previously unassimilated memory’ is doubly 
problematic: it contradicts another of its central tenets, namely the neuroscientific 
pathology of dissociation that happens to a ‘passive victim’,16 whilst also inscribing a 
privileged position and role to the trained cultural analyst. It is this analyst who is 
invested by trauma theory with the authority to identify and select for critical attention 
those cultural texts ‘that are most likely to reveal trauma’s absent traces’, to exercise 
empathy in discerning what is unspeakable in those texts, and to interpret their wider 
significance.17 This is to abandon the emphasis placed by cultural studies on ‘the 
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situated, local and multiple readings of historically specific readers and audiences’, 
thereby avoiding questions of ‘for whom, when, where and in what circumstances are 
particular texts read or experienced as trauma texts?’18 ‘Trauma criticism’, concludes 
Radstone, ‘arguably constructs and polices the boundary of what can be recognised 
as trauma’.19  
 Trauma theory derived from the medical discourses of PTSD and 
neuroscience, often in productive combination with other theoretical frameworks, has 
been taken up in Irish Studies and underpins a valuable body of scholarship on 
memory and the Irish past, including the Troubles. In her Introduction to Memory 
Ireland: The Famine and the Troubles, for example, 20 Oona Frawley quotes Caruth 
to ground the volume’s framing argument that, ‘since the traumatic event is not 
experienced as it occurs’, trauma disrupts but also stimulates the desire to shape 
linear temporal meaning of the event in narrative.21 Tracing the shift in interest 
stimulated by trauma theory, from individual to ‘collective experience of trauma’, 
Frawley identifies the initial application of this idea to the legacies of the Great 
Famine, and ‘ways in which it is possible to move forward and let go of that 
perceived trauma’22 through representation and commemoration, in the context of its 
150th anniversary in the mid 1990s. Subsequently this same model has ben applied 
to the recent history and living memory of the Troubles. Stefanie Lehner, for 
example, uses Caruth, Felman and Laub – together with Jennifer Edkins’ work on the 
political implications of trauma theory and Berber Bevernage’s concept of 
‘irrevocable time’ (referring to ‘a “haunting” past’ that ‘got “stuck” and persists into the 
present’)23 – to ‘expose the troubled position that the traumatic past occupies in 
present Northern Ireland’.24 Lehner’s argument is developed through analysis of two 
novels produced following the ceasefires of 1994 and explores in Caruthian terms 
‘(l)iterature’s potential to make “unthought knowledge” ... and the “unclaimed 
experience” of trauma ... available and indirectly accessible to us as readers’ in 
encodings that ‘enable an empathic witnessing’.25 Fionna Barber makes similar use 
of Caruth to ground her study of art practice in Northern Ireland before and after the 
Belfast Agreement of 1998.26  
 Generative and and subtle as such analyses have often been, they are 
vulnerable to Radstone’s critique of the trauma theory underpinning them, for its 
inherent pathologising of the subject as traumatised under the impact of a 
determining external event, which has been selected and interpreted as such by 
cultural analysts trained in deciphering its unspeakable effects. Moreover, in applying 
a singular Caruthian model to very different historical contexts and cultural practices, 
the specificity of events and their ‘wounding’ effects upon meaning and subjectivity 
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tend to be reduced to so many instances of ‘Ireland’s traumatic past’. A further 
inherent problem, identified by some working within this paradigm, concerns how 
‘collective trauma’, held to affect entire communities or nations and to have 
transgenerational impact, might be conceptualised ‘while avoiding the danger of 
ascribing to that group a collective psyche ... as if it were like an individual’.27   
 A second orthodox discourse of trauma has flourished in policy and practice 
concerning provision of support for victims of Troubles-related violence. Originating 
in an expansion of services for increasing numbers of people seeking professional 
help in the early years of peace process, the idea of ‘conflict-related trauma’28 was 
promoted by a wide range of organisations in civil society and a conventional view 
became mainstream in public debate. This was institutionalised by the British 
Government’s victims strategy from 1998 (subsequently continued under the 
devolved administration from 2007), involving the construction of an infrastructure to 
implement policy and channel significant sums of public money into PTSD 
counselling and other services offered by the statutory and voluntary sectors and 
grassroots victims’ organisations.29 Chris Gilligan identifies the underlying 
assumptions of this conventional view stemming from the medical model of PTSD: 
that ‘an event, or events, in the past causes the symptoms in the present’;30 that 
‘trauma is created by conflict, but more likely to be manifested in a period of peace’;31 
and that the provision of public services offering treatment for trauma in the post-
conflict present furthers the restoration of psychological healing whilst also 
addressing the ‘psychosocial dimensions’ of peace-building, thereby enabling both 
traumatized individuals and the wider society to move on from the past.32 
 The normative temporality implicit in what Allan Young calls the ‘architecture 
of traumatic time’,33 envisaged as a binary, linear relation between past and present, 
is particularly problematic in the context of ‘transitional’ societies like Northern 
Ireland. When causation and ‘healing’ of suffering are mapped too neatly onto a 
simplistic view of ‘war as bad and peace as good’ for mental health,34 more complex 
temporalities are obscured; as when time flows backwards from disturbing 
experiences in the present to past events, illustrated by the question asked post-
Agreement by retired RUC officers, ‘What was it all for?’35 For Brandon Hamber, 
alignment of the recovery of victims of violence with the politics of peace-building 
fails to recognise how individual experience may be ‘out of sync’ with what is 
happening collectively, and be ‘“moving” at a different pace’.36 This gives rise to 
‘political and social pressure upon victims to remain “in step” with the national or 
political process’ and demands that they ‘move ... forward’ in their psychological 
healing through what is termed ‘closure’.37  
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 The associated ‘medicalisation’ of distress is especially pernicious in a 
context of political violence since it ‘pathologises a social phenomenon’:38 Those 
diagnosed as suffering from PTSD are constructed as ‘passive victims overwhelmed 
by their experiences in the past’39 and offered a therapeutic solution that avoids, and 
displaces attention from, political considerations of responsibility for violence, of 
justice, and of overcoming divisions in the making of an agreed future society.  
Hamber argues that the ‘concept (of) trauma and PTSD specifically, drives thinking 
towards homogeneity, as if all experiences of violence have the same outcome or 
need the same treatment’.40 In Northern Ireland as in other ‘post-conflict’ societies, 
the discourse of trauma works performatively ‘to change the personal and local 
language of suffering; that is, victims start to express themselves in medical 
language (“I am suffering from PTSD”) rather than express how they really feel’.41 
According to Gilligan, the professionalisation of care associated with PTSD 
undermines the ‘informal social support networks’ grounded in ‘protective community 
bonds’ that previously provided adaptive resources to deal with and absorb the 
effects of violence;42 and sustained what might now be described as resilience.43 
Hamber calls instead for close attention to ‘the context of violence (and) its cultural 
specificities’,44 including the ways political violence works to alter and destroy 
existing ‘individual and community meaning systems’ as well as social bonds and 
relations.45 Understanding the ‘distinctive political, social and cultural meanings, and, 
thus, specific impacts’ of ‘different violent and political incidents’ is therefore 
essential.46 This requires recognition of those affected as ‘active agents who are 
involved in giving meaning to their experiences’47 and engaging in forms of ‘social 
action’ in pursuit of their own goals according to their own articulated needs and 
desires.48  
 A third area of activity engaged with trauma in the context of the Northern 
Ireland Troubles and the peace process concerns practices of popular and grass-
roots storytelling. These have flourished in post-ceasefires Northern Ireland in close 
proximity to public debate and politics about dealing with the ‘legacies’ of the conflict 
in terms of truth, justice and reconciliation. An orthodoxy has emerged here too, in 
the notion of the ‘healing’ potential of storytelling in relation to the trauma of a still-
present past. Derived from the discourse of ‘healing is revealing’ which emerged in 
debates surrounding the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the 
mid 1990s,49 this was taken up in Northern Ireland notably by the Healing Through 
Remembering (HTR) organisation formed in 2001. In its wide consultation about how 
people could best ‘remember the events connected with the conflict ... and in so 
doing, individually and collectively contribute to the healing of the wounds of society’, 
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HTR discovered popular support for the idea that those telling their stories, ‘if listened 
to empathically could experience a degree of healing’; as well as concerns that 
‘recounting painful experiences could ... “reopen old wounds”’.50 This discourse 
influenced the subsequent development of storytelling practices and ‘the recording of 
trauma memories from conflict’.51 For example, the film-maker and founder of the 
Prisons Memory Archive, Cahal McLaughlin, while sensibly cautious about 
‘claim(ing) any healing potential’ for his own films, has situated his practice in relation 
to a range of critical writing on trauma and ‘reparative memory’ which includes that of 
Caruth and Laub.52 It has also found its way into policy formulations on ‘dealing with 
the past’, such as the Report of the Consultative Group on the Past, which 
recommends storytelling as ‘a process designed to facilitate individual and societal 
healing and to break the cycle of conflict’.53  
 Running through these debates, and widely deployed in media reportage and 
popular understandings of traumatic experience, is another conventional assumption: 
that of ‘closure’. The desire for closure, in the sense of a wished for ending to 
emotional distress, is routinely expressed by those harmed by political violence, 
whether sought through storytelling or, alternatively, through campaigning for truth 
and justice in unresolved cases of killing from the conflict.54 In the words of Gillian 
Grigg of the War Widows’ Association of Great Britain, in her evidence to the House 
of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee in 2005: ‘While you have unfinished 
business, whatever it happens to be, to do with what happened, then you cannot 
have closure; you cannot completely move forward; you cannot take a second new 
life.’55 This vocabulary of closure contradictorily echoes both exhortations to victims 
to keep ‘in step’ with the requirements of peace-building, and concerns about the 
difficulties encountered in attempts to ‘move forward and let go of’ a traumatic past. 
The popularity and concomitant instability of this idea of closure signals a set of 
issues concerning emotional and affective experience and how it is lived, handled 
and potentially transformed, that the PTSD paradigm – with its emphasis on linear 
temporality and a clear demarcation between past and present on one hand, and its 
homogenizing tendencies on the other – is ill-equipped to address.  
 
From trauma to feeling and emotion in history: shifting the frame  
Running through critiques of trauma theory and practice grounded on the diagnostic 
of PTSD and ideas from neuroscience is a set of concerns about its lack of detailed 
attention to the substance of ‘traumatic experience’ (if indeed we can so name a 
condition that is by definition ‘unexperienced’) involving a range of human feelings 
and emotions as these are embodied and made meaningful within specific historical 
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cultures. In this second part of the article, I advocate making a shift in the analytical 
framework we use to think about the affective legacies of the Irish Troubles and their 
relation to ‘post-conflict’ activity to ‘come to terms with’ or ‘deal with the past’ in the 
Irish peace process, away from trauma and towards the domain of emotion, feeling 
and affect in history.  
 To open up this kind of enquiry is to move beyond the particular framing 
emphases and circumscriptions of trauma, in four main ways. Firstly, freed from 
trauma’s focus on pathological affective states implicitly counterposed to an 
‘untraumatic’ norm, more inclusive consideration could be given to emotions and 
feelings in times of war, conflict and political violence, utilising more open, less rigid 
categorisations of what these consist in, what they mean, and how they work within 
historically specific cultures that pre-exist and continue after violent events. 
Secondly, moving beyond explanations of the effects of violent conflict on emotional 
life that reduce this to external causation by ‘the event’, richer, more complex and 
nuanced accounts of the relation between external and internal worlds are required. 
These would enable emotional experience to be considered not only as a wound 
crying out, but as the medium for a range of interactions as well as ‘disconnects’56 
between historical subjectivities and socio-cultural worlds consisting not only of 
events but also of frameworks of meaning. Thirdly, by acknowledging the active 
engagement of those affected by ‘trauma’ in making sense of and representing their 
own emotional experiences, work on the interpretation of states of feeling need no 
longer be restricted to analysis undertaken by professional authorities (the cultural 
critic, the trauma counsellor, the academic historian), but would seek understanding 
of how emotional life within a society is recognized and ‘felt’ by situated individuals 
and social groups. Critical enquiry could then focus its attention on ’the real feelings 
and desires of actual victims’57 – or, to avoid the exclusive and politicized 
connotations attached to this term in Northern Ireland, of those who have been 
subjected to, or harmed by, or engaged in political violence (or all of these) – when 
freed from hegemonic silencing and the pressure to represent themselves as trauma 
victims. Fourthly, abandoning linear conceptions of temporality and socio-political 
imperatives for ‘premature closure’58 points to the need for investigations of the 
complex temporalities of emotion and feeling within structures of power, compliance 
and resistance; and of the activisms that seek transformation of conflict-related 
emotions through future-oriented efforts ‘to change social reality, forge new 
connections and align inner reality with what is happening externally’.59  
 In my thinking about these issues, I am finding resources for a new analytical 
framework in three areas of investigation which propose distinct though in certain 
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respects overlapping approaches. These are the tradition of object-relations 
psychoanalytic theory derived from the work of Melanie Klein and associated in the 
UK with the Tavistock Institute in London, cultural materialist analysis centred on 
Raymond Williams’ conception of ‘structures of feeling’, and work developed since 
the turn of the century on emotional histories. In what follows I discuss each in turn. 
 Object-relations theory ‘holds out a perspective for the construction of a 
psychoanalysis that takes account of social relations’,60 and demonstrates ‘a 
potential willingness to investigate psychic life in terms of the particularity of (actual) 
social relationships ... located historically within a specific culture’.61 Embodied 
emotional and psychic life is understood as a dynamic process occurring within a 
person’s inner world, largely unconscious, peopled by imagined objects or 'imagos' 
with which the self interacts to establish various kinds of internal object relations. 
These imagined objects partly derive their character from, but also affect perceptions 
of, external others and social situations, which are experienced according to internal 
psychic reality. Expressions of feeling, behaviours and relationships in the social 
world thus become vehicles for 'acting out' internal object relations, managing 
internal disturbances and conflicts, and controlling or managing emotions. 
 This kind of psychoanalytic thinking offers more dynamic conceptions of the 
emotional substance of psychic and social life than those found in conventional 
trauma theory. Indeed, much of the critique presented earlier in this article is 
informed by this tradition. In making her argument that ‘the traumatization effect does 
not appear to reside in the nature of the event ... but (in) what the mind later does to 
memory’, Radstone quotes the object-relations psychoanalyst, Caroline Garland: 
 
Whatever the nature of the event ... eventually (the survivor) comes to make 
sense of it in terms of the most troubled and troubling of the relationships 
between the objects that are felt to inhabit his internal world. That way the 
survivor is at least making something recognisable and familiar out of the 
extraordinary, giving it a meaning (original ellipsis).62   
 
Hamber’s thinking about extreme political violence, trauma, and victimhood is also 
rooted in object-relations theory derived from his training as a clinical psychologist 
and psychotherapist, as this encountered a ‘tidal wave of emotion’ in local meetings 
with victims of apartheid-era violence whilst preparing for the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in 1995.63 The object-relations model complements and 
may be integrated into cultural and historical approaches to feeling and emotion, and 
opens up ways of thinking that understand these phenomena as a medium through 
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which the interconnections between internal and external worlds are produced, 
regulated, contested and transformed.  
 Raymond Williams’ cultural materialism is also centrally concerned with the 
agency of historically-situated people in the making of meanings, the articulation of 
the felt texture of personal and social experience, and the challenging of received 
understandings and dominant frameworks for making sense. Williams proposes the 
concept ‘structures of feeling’64 to think about ‘meanings and values as they are 
actively lived and felt, and the relations between these and formal or systematic 
beliefs’ – relations which may range from assent or dissent to more complex 
interactions and negotiations.65 It draws attention to what he calls ‘characteristic 
elements of impulse, restraint, and tone; specifically affective elements of 
consciousness and relationships: ... thought as felt and feeling as thought’, often ‘at 
the very edge’ of ‘practical consciousness’ and not yet fully recognised or articulated 
within existing frameworks of understanding.66 For Williams, ‘this felt sense of the 
quality of life at a particular place and time’ is the medium of a ‘community of 
experience’ linking those who share a class position and belong to a generation.67 It 
is hard to pin down and study, especially ‘(o)nce the carriers of such a structure 
die’.68 But what Williams calls these ‘social experiences in solution’ can be discerned 
in the ‘precipitated’ form of cultural representations, the stories and images that we 
make of our lived experience.69 Williams here identifies a gap between lived 
experience and its representation, and invites further reflection on how this is 
mediated and how emotions ‘in solution’ might be accessed. Critical attention can 
then focus on the quality of the precipitating voices, the forms they create to 
articulate ‘embryonic’ or ‘emergent’ new structures of feeling, with their limitations 
and achievements, and the social positions from which they speak.70  
 As Harding and Pribram have argued, Williams’ concept brings the emotions 
into focus ‘as rich, complex sociocultural practices’ that are ‘culturally constituted and 
culturally shared’, with ascertainable effects;71 and enables us to ask ‘what new or 
changing formations of emotion has it become possible to think or feel at a given 
moment?’ 72 According to In their useful critique, these possibilities are limited by 
Williams’ tendency to homogenize ‘vast singular structures of feeling reflecting 
unified configurations of subject positions – class or generational – at a particular 
historical moment or location’, and an insufficiently developed sense of ‘conflict, 
competition or struggle between the structures of feeling of any epoch’.73 Revised, as 
they suggest, to refer to ‘a multiplicity of structures of feeling that operate in a 
complex interactive web’ that is ‘interactional ... (and) historically changing’,74 
‘structures of feeling’ provides a valuable conceptual basis for analysing the 
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configuration of felt experiences that manifested in Northern Ireland in response to 
the violence of the Troubles, and the shifts that have occurred ‘post-conflict’. These 
include the emergence of social interest in trauma, therapy and healing, and also 
how the so-called ceasefire generation post-1994 has ‘respond(ed) in its own ways 
to the world ... feeling its whole life in certain ways differently, and shaping its 
creative response into a new structure of feeling’.75  
 More variegated accounts of the contingency, context and social dynamics of 
feeling can be found in recent studies of the history and politics of emotion, including work 
that is directly concerned with emotional life in times of war and conflict.  While 
emphasising emotional life as a cultural and social phenomenon, historians of emotion 
have to confront its intersection with the felt energies and affects arising in what Joanna 
Bourke terms ‘the emotional body’,76 evident in the ‘fight or flight’ reactions to fear arising 
in combat situations,77 and in the prevalence of stomach aches and upsets amongst 
soldiers on the Western Front during the First World War identified by Michael Roper.78 
However, caught in a tension between embodiment and signification, our own affective 
experience is not self-evident and transparent but requires ‘emotional labour’ to 
understand and interpret what goes on inside, in the internal world, at the ‘boundaries 
between “bodily space” and social space”’.79 We discover, reflect on, and may attempt to 
articulate, what it is that we feel on the basis of a ‘vocabulary of emotion’.80 These words 
have, as the much-quoted anthropologist William Reddy puts it, a ‘unique capacity to alter 
what they “refer” to or what they “represent”’; so, for example, ‘the sensation of fear’ may 
be conjured, or altered, by ‘acts of speaking (or writing) one’s fear’.81 ‘As the words 
change, so too does the meaning of the emotion within a particular culture’.82  
 The prevailing languages of emotion are imbricated with social norms and what 
Claire Langhamer calls ‘dominant emotional codes and standards’, which also form and 
shift historically in relation to changing conditions of life. 83  For Barbara Rosenwein, 
‘emotions have social functions and follow social rules’, providing ‘tools with which we 
manage social life’ and conduct our relations with others.84 She proposes the concept of 
‘emotional communities’ to refer to the ‘systems of feeling’ that are active within social 
institutions and networks – ‘families, neighbourhoods, parliaments, guilds, monasteries, 
parish church (congregations)’– and which establish ‘what these communities (and the 
individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to them; the evaluations 
that they make about others’ emotions; the nature of the affective bonds between people 
that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, 
tolerate and deplore’.85 Rosenwein argues that multiple emotional communities jostle and 
overlap within a society at any particular historical moment, constituting conflicting and 
sometimes contradictory common sense about the meaning and value of an emotion such 
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as hatred;86 and that ‘people move (and moved) continually from one such community to 
another’, adjusting their emotional expression accordingly.87 This can be seen in Roper’s 
analysis of the emotional survival skills that soldiers exercised during the First World War, 
which demonstrates how ‘models of care’ derived from their ‘closest emotional bonds’ 
within the family, particularly between mothers and sons, provided soldiers with ‘emotional 
reference points’ to draw on in their relationships within the institution of the Army at the 
front.88 In an analysis that suggests how we might think concretely about Gilligan’s 
‘informal support networks’ and the resilience of those affected by the violence of the 
Troubles, Roper explores how soldiers tried to ‘keep their spirits up’, took care of each 
other, and coped with ‘emotions like fear, anger, love and loss’, which were shaped 
‘according to particular class and family cultures and idioms of expression’.89  
 In handling feelings such as loss or love within social life, then, while we ‘exercise 
... emotional agency’, we are not free agents.90 Rather, we situate our own feelings in 
relation to cultures – or ‘structures of feeling’, used by both Rosenwein and Roper91 – that 
shape patterns, expectations and models of experience. Emotional communities and 
cultures with specific locations in time and space develop particular ways of organising felt 
subjectivity, enabling us to recognise and communicate our emotional lives and 
interactions. On this basis our emotions are felt to be validated by, or to be transgressive 
of, cultural norms and values. Thus they have political implications. Handled in culturally 
sanctioned ways according to ‘feeling-rules’ that govern their expression or concealment, 
emotions are subject to repression, restraint and sanctioned release.92 The gendering of 
such rules is demonstrated in Lucy Noakes’ study of ‘the management of female grief’ in 
anticipation of, and response to, air raids on Britain during the Second World War.93 This 
explores how a long-established ‘emotional economy ... emphasiz(ing) stoicism and 
reticence’ as the ‘(desirable) codes of behaviour’ for men was extended to women as a  
means of curtailing the ‘disruptive’ and ‘destabiliz(ing)’ impact of mass bereavement on 
national morale and the war effort.94 In wartime British culture, the requirements of 
emotional restraint, whether internally adopted through engagement with popular cultural 
texts or externally imposed by national and local state authorities, policed public 
expressions of emotion whilst constituting the private sphere as the location of greater 
licence, and responsibility, in emotional life. However, the negotiation of felt experience 
between people and social institutions is never only about emotional control, but  
also involves the social and political ‘evoking’ of emotion, as in the case of fear, which 
Bourke shows to have been incited historically in relation to shifting social anxieties from 
the afterlife of hell to terrorism.95  
 Emotions may be felt collectively, even contagiously, by people in social groups 
undergoing a common experience, including those recognized as a ‘traumatized 
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community’; and such collectivities themselves become the object of emotional 
management, as in official strategies for avoiding panic in crowd control.96 Yet varied and 
unexpected emotional reactions also arise within groups, which are never homogeneous; 
as can be seen in the diverse expressions of happiness, fortitude, and a sense of 
reassurance perversely derived from the recognition that other people are also worried, 
reported in response to the danger of bombings during the Blitz.97 This leads Bourke to 
conclude that, far from belonging to any pre-given collective entity such as a class, 
emotions work to ‘align people with others’, thereby constituting them as a social group 
(and, as Sara Ahmed argues, organising their felt relation to others);98 so ‘fear places 
people’, sorting them into positions within a social hierarchy.99 The question for historians 
of emotion, then, is ‘what is (an emotion such as) fear doing?’100 Applying this argument to 
Northern Ireland since the Troubles, Bourke suggests that the ‘invention of trauma society’ 
has ‘framed, created and managed extremes of anxiety’ at the cost of recognizing 
people’s resilience, creativity and courage.101 ‘The issue’, Bourke concludes, ‘is not 
whether we are traumatised, but how we are transformed’.102 This suggests other ways of 
thinking about the temporality of emotions and the meaning of ‘moving on’.   
 Historians of emotion offer complex models of emotional life and temporality, 
sensitive to what I have called the ‘afterlife’ of emotion and the ways in which feelings 
‘live on’ and move dynamically in time.103 In one sense, following the temporal 
architecture of conventional trauma theory, emotion and affect can be seen as the 
product of an originating event or episode such as violent conflict ‘in the past’. 
Emotions of various kinds come to be experienced and understood as something 
caused by and attached to this event. According to one kind of account, this emotion 
then persists continuously after the event into the present, where it is always ready to 
be given expression again; as, for example, in Freud’s thinking about melancholy as 
persistent loss. Another kind of account sees the emotional and affective response to 
the event becoming overlaid by subsequent emotional experience and development, 
such that it becomes progressively distanced in time while retaining potential to be 
reconnected to the present. This can be seen in the phenomenon of ‘return’ to, and 
re-experiencing of, a disturbing event which has not been psychically ‘absorbed’ or 
‘digested’ at the time of its occurrence but remains in the unconscious as a ‘trace’ – 
what Roper calls ‘emotional residues’ – capable of ‘animating later recollections’.104 
Eva Hoffman, writing of the ‘the transmission of loss across generations’ after the 
Holocaust, describes a form of knowledge that is ‘not a memory’ but ‘states of feeling 
conveyed by survivors to their offspring’.105 ‘What we children of survivors knew .. 
were the emotional sequelae of our elders’ experiences’;106 ‘affective messages’ 
communicated ‘by some means’, such that ‘children speak of being permeated by 
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sensations of panic and deadliness, of shame and guilt’, conveying an ‘imperative to 
perform impossible psychic tasks’ of rescue and reparation’.107 
 Even if temporally located ‘in the past’, then, emotions are durational and involve 
complex relations between past, present and future. Their temporality may be fluid rather 
than fixed once and for all, and characterised in various ways; as longevity, but also as 
capacities for recurrence, re-emergence, ebb and flow’, repetition. Further complications 
stem from the mutability of affect and emotion, and what Bourke calls its ‘fluctuations in 
intensity over time’.108 One emotion or affective state may also transform into another –
such as sadness into anger, or anger into guilt – and these may condense together into 
compound formations like those found in Derry/Londonderry after the Bloody Sunday 
shootings.109 This points to the way that emotion and affect can be considered according 
to a second kind of temporality, as produced and expressed, lived and handled in the 
context of circumstances and concerns of a present moment. Much of the work on 
memory and subjectivity undertaken within oral history and life-history analysis has 
emphasised the making of new meanings, namings and interpretations of experience, 
including states of feeling, that subjects produce retrospectively, possibly many years 
later. Making sense of past events in new ways may transform what is felt about them 
now, as Nicola King argues in her take on Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit, translated 
as ‘afterwardsness’.110 The oral historian Alistair Thomson captures the dynamics of 
temporality within the ordinary life course, and the way life transitions associated with the 
process of ageing and looking back over time may trigger a re-evaluation of feelings long 
attached to past events, in his phrase ‘experience never ends’.111  
 Work on the history of emotions is also opening up the significance of futurity in 
constituting feelings in the present. In her work on the history of love, Claire Langhamer 
understands emotional life in Britain during the Second World War in terms of a temporal 
break in those ‘normal’ patterns and expectations of courtship, engagement and marriage 
that traditionally gave meaning and value to sexual attractions as well as criteria for 
evaluating and choosing sexual partners and behaviours, founded on the projection and 
planning of a shared trajectory of life in the future. Amid the fears and uncertainties of 
wartime, permeated by the ‘feeling you might be gone tomorrow’, confidence in any 
imaginable future was shattered.112 This produced a new emotional ethos of ‘living for the 
moment’ and fostered desire for short-term relationships and hasty marriages grounded 
on immediate gratification rather than long-term commitment; for, as one female Mass-
Observer remarked in 1942, when a ‘man’s mind is so uncertain of its future he cannot in 
fairness to himself or another undertake a tie of permanence ... the only thing to do so 
long as the war continues is to live for the present only, and evade ties so deep that their 
destruction would destroy as well one’s stability’.113 Such considerations of futurity open 
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up further questions, about how subjective composure organised within a short-term 
temporal horizon of this kind is interpreted and evaluated subsequently as one looks back 
having ‘cross(ed) into a new temporal space’ of the postwar with its ‘radical reorientation 
of the present’.114  
 
Conclusion  
I have argued in this article that historical approaches to the phenomena of feeling 
and emotion, especially those concerned with war and conflict, open up new 
perspectives on emotional life that move beyond the frame of trauma and avoid 
some of its difficulties. These approaches offer a number of productive concepts for 
understanding the social dynamics and temporalities of lived experience and memory 
and its representation during and after the Troubles, and suggest new kinds of 
orientation towards, for example, the storytelling and life history projects and archives 
that have flourished during the peace process. As well as informing what it is that 
such projects explore, by seeing their work as a production of emotional histories 
richer use could be made of the stories they elicit and collect, as sources for 
investigating structures of feeling and the meanings that are being made and remade 
of emotional life over a fifty-year period since the onset of the conflict.115  With a new 
horizon of the future now opened up by the UK’s ‘Brexit’ vote to leave the European 
Union, posing the threat of a restored ‘hard border’ in Ireland that reawakens 
emotions ‘of the past’, historical approaches to the social dynamics and afterlife of 
emotion and feeling in memory offer tools for understanding the present that are 
more specific, flexible, multifaceted and complex than those offered by Caruthian 
trauma theory.  
 This is not to advocate ‘history’ at the expense of ‘psychology’, and I want to 
end by arguing for the retention of a psychoanalytic dimension to the investigation of 
emotional histories, rooted in the object-relations tradition. Feelings and emotions 
are, as the social historian Michael Roper puts it, ‘always relational’,116 in that they 
arise and make themselves felt in relation to others, both real and imagined, and are 
mediated, in psychoanalytic terms, through internal object relations that figure modes 
of intersubjectivity and colour with feeling our social and political relationships. For 
object-relations theorists, recovery from deeply disturbing experience and the 
nurturing of psychic health depends upon capacities for 'reparation' being mobilized 
to think about the meanings and emotions attached to internal objects, to undo 
defensive splitting within the psyche, and to integrate contradictory emotions and 
conflicting aspects of the self within a less polarized inner world. The work of 
reparation is strengthened by the 'introjection', or taking in, of such capacities where 
 16 
they are encountered in social life. This, as well as the perception of discrepancies 
between anticipations derived from the internal world and the complex realities of the 
external social world, enables 'something new to happen' within both psychic and 
social reality.117  
 Work by historians of emotion has already begun to explore how concepts 
and insights from object relations theory may be used in historical interpretation of 
emotional formations and dynamics; as in my previous thinking about ‘reparative 
remembering’ as a means of undoing ‘defensive’ modes of subjective composure of 
the self, and in Roper’s reading of soldiers’ writing as a means to ‘get rid of disturbing 
feelings’ or as attempts at ‘containing’ otherwise ‘nameless dread’.118 There is scope 
for further work of this kind, to explore how emotional transformations in self and 
society are brought about after war and conflict, and to illuminate the complex and 
challenging meanings of ‘moving on’.  
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